Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Blog
The first article I read was “China and the “AfPak” Issue” by Michael D. Swaine. This long and extensive essay discusses China’s role in the conflict from many fronts. This analysis of Chinese interests, policies in regard to the AfPak problem and the Obama strategy suggests that all signs point to the continuation of China’s current cautious, limited stance toward the issue. Continuing from the past the Chinese leadership’s basic caution, and many of its concerns, are heavily influenced by China’s longstanding strategic interests in Pakistan, (mostly counter-balancing India’s realm of influence). On the other hand, Beijing’s limited yet arguably growing support for many U.S. and ISAF goals is also rooted in a sometimes cross-cutting set of Chinese interests in economic development, counterterrorism, the maintenance of friendly relations with Washington, and long-term stability in not only Afghanistan and Pakistan but also Central and South Asia as a whole.
The article continues with a more realist perspective, suggesting China’s interests suggests that, given existing larger conditions, and assuming relations between Islamabad, India and Afghanistan remain constant, Beijing in all probability will not attempt to push Islamabad to devote more resources and energies to the destruction of Afghanistan-oriented terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan and to deny sanctuaries within Pakistan to such groups. Also, even if Pakistan were to shift its stance (e.g., in response to a major escalation in terrorist attacks on the Pakistani government), it is not clear that Beijing would then encourage the Pakistani leadership to exert more efforts against the Afghan Taliban, given its larger desire to keep Pakistan focused on India, both militarily and politically. It is more likely that the Chinese leadership would attempt to aid a faltering Pakistani regime by providing more support to its military and intelligence services, while increasing economic and diplomatic assistance to Islamabad and strengthening the India-Pakistani border.
This essay was extremely interesting and insightful. I had yet to read an article that discussed and dissected the foreign policy of China, a very important and upcoming world super power on this issue. I realized how important a role China plays in the issue, being relatively next door to the issue, as a opposed to the US who, after withdrawing, will have a much easier time staying far away from the conflict and ensuing situation. China’s interest seem to be overwhelmingly concerned with keeping Pakistan stable in order to balance out India’s realm of control, not allowing them to become too powerful and influential in the region. Sadly, this translates into a lack of concern about counter-terrorism efforts, and efforts to smooth out issues with these groups instead of face them head on, which could potentially weaken Pakistan’s government for enough time to allow India to become overwhelmingly more influential.
Another very interesting article which I read was “The Pakistan and Afghanistan End Game” by Ashley J. Tellis for the Yale Global. The article discusses Pakistan’s role in the conflict, and the under-covered yet enormous role that Pakistan plays in supporting terrorists, and why. In an effort to secure a major position in Afghanistan and to slow India’s rise, Pakistan has mobilized militants and terrorists on both sides of its borders. While the Afghan Taliban fighting US and NATO forces continue to enjoy Pakistan’s support, Islamabad has changed its previous policy of supporting anti-Indian insurgencies with that of supporting terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which claimed responsibility for the deadly assault on Mumbai in 2008. With tension persisting between the two South Asian rivals, this tactic not only increases the prospect of major war between New Delhi and Islamabad, but, given Lashkar’s growing reach, could have global consequences.
Given the organization’s vast presence, its ability to raise funds worldwide, and its ability to conduct militant activities at great distances from its home base, LeT has become ISI’s preferred tool for its ongoing covert war with India. This includes the campaign that Pakistan is currently waging against the Indian presence in Afghanistan and against US counterinsurgency efforts in that country. Active LeT operations in Pakistan’s northwestern border areas involve close collaboration with Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna. Washington has now reached the conclusion that LeT represents a threat to America’s national interests second only to Al Qaeda and in fact exceeds the latter by many measures.
This article was quite eye opening, and gave me more perspective on why Pakistan has been known to fund terrorists then I had every known. For 40 years Pakistan had funded local uprisings in the Kashmir region, and every time were met with humiliating and quick defeats by the Indian army. Having an apparent over-emphasized fear of India’s growing power, Pakistan has resorted to funding terrorist groups which are much harder to dismantle, and offer a constant disruption which will pull resources and time from India. It seems Pakistan picked up this tactic following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan during the Cold War, in which it funded various Islamic extremists to fight, and consequently succeeded in driving out the Soviets.
Another article is “NY bomb plot will not terrorise Americans, says Obama” from BBC World News. Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old Pakistan-born US citizen, was arrested at John F Kennedy airport on Monday on board a plane. Police arrested him shortly before the Dubai-bound plane was due to take off, and US Attorney General Eric Holder says he will be charged with an act of terrorism and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, connected with the SUV that was found loaded with an improvised explosive device in Times Square.
Investigators say Mr Shahzad, from Connecticut, has told them he was acting alone and had no connections with foreign militant groups. Reports from Pakistan say Mr Shahzad's father-in-law and another associate of the suspect have been arrested in the port city of Karachi - although there has been no official confirmation. Sources told the BBC that Mr Shahzad was in Karachi for at least a month last year and other reports say he spent some months in the frontier city of Peshawar, close to Taliban strongholds and training grounds. On Sunday, the Pakistani Taliban said it was responsible for the failed bombing attempt and it threatened suicide attacks on US cities.
This article was obviously very relevant to myself and my life. This would have been a major situation in New York City. I live 30 minutes outside of the city, and my brother lives and works in the city and my dad works in the city as well. Now that the arrest has been made, it will be interesting to follow up on the alleged ties to the Pakistani Taliban. The man claims to have worked alone, but the Taliban has allegedly claimed responsibility for the failed attack. If this is true it will be one of the first time that the Taliban has attempted a major terrorist attack in the United States, and not a more “terrorism” centered organization such as Al- Quaeda, and it will mean a new chapter in Homeland Security and possibly the war in Afghanistan and relations with Pakistan as well.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Blog on Model UN
• Best aspect
The best aspect of the model UN simulation for me was the freedom to do whatever we wanted. We realized of immediately that what plan of action we took, there could be one hundred repercussions, both negative and positive. Normally students just look at certain situations and determine whether good or bad decisions were made, and analyze the situation. Rarely are students placed in a group and given the freedom to act as both foreign and interior policy makers and make actual decisions. An example is that my group was the Taliban, and beforehand we had ideas of bombings and attacks, and various mischievous activities. After the simulation started however, we really came together in understanding the repercussions of certain acts, and how particular acts of violence could benefit us more that others.
• Worst aspect
The worst aspect what the response time of the news room. As well as the slow response, many requests that we put in actually got accepted, but were never released. This caused a situation in which the first day was very idle. We realized that a lot might happen on the second day, but that we would not have time to react to it with any real policies or actions, which made us lose some participation vigor.
• Relevance to course materials
I felt the simulation had enormous relevance to the course. Particular key points were used by us, in particular realism, being the Taliban. More than that, the whole simulations is a mock demonstration of what international relations (perhaps international relations gone wrong) is like. It takes all the theories we learn about and gives us a first-hand look into why things and events play out the way they do, and how it is not always as simple as it seems in a classroom.
• Did preparation time give you what you needed to know?
Yes, I felt we had adequate preparation time. I myself was responsible for knowing about the drug trade of the Taliban, and feel I gained a moderately vast knowledge of how the drug trade works, and the monetary benefits that it brings the Taliban.
• Best idea YOU had?
The best idea I had was probably suggesting a meeting with a Russian arms dealer to acquire ground to air rockets that we needed to prevent helicopter attacks. We kept requesting meetings with countries, but no one would meet with us. I pointed out that the Taliban does much more business with the Russian mob than any state, and so we sent in a request to the news room for a meeting which we got, and acquired 20 ground to air rockets as well as a small arsenal of various other guns. The guns were used in the successful mission to steal the nuclear bomb.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Intro to IR
4/8/10
The Taliban; Its Drug Trade and Counter Intelligence.
The Taliban is a rogue regime, ever pressed for cash and ever fighting to increase its power and influence. As with any rogue regime, the Taliban relies on whatever resources it has. In South America the cartels use cocaine, in Eastern Europe trafficking girls is a favorite of organized crime; the Taliban uses the poppy plant, and poppy derived drugs. The poppy plant is the first step in producing any opiate including heroine and opium. The difficult task is figuring out just how great a part the poppy plant plays for the Taliban, as records to drug trafficking are estimates, and most information is still unknown. What sources do know is that seventy two percent of the worlds poppy based drugs come from Afghanistan. Ninety six percent of the poppy grown is grown in areas controlled by the Taliban. While extremism and power are perhaps at the heart of the Taliban, it is clear poppies and the drug trade are the veins and arteries.
The Taliban remains in the dark about being directly linked to the drug trade. However, the group openly taxes the production, processing, shipment, and sales of opiates, and goes as far as to keep reciets of these revenues. From this information, it is estimated that the Taliban brought in roughly 50 million dollars in 2000 from opiates.1 However the CIA, DEA, and other foreign intelligence is aware that the Taliban is in-fact directly connected to the drug trade, which would mean their profits far exceed 40 million dollars into a multi-billion dollar industry. Most of the opiates are transported into Europe. Tony Blaire is quoted as saying “the arms the Taliban are buying are paid for with the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets.”1
The complexity comes with understanding the hierarchy of the drug trade. This hierarchy system is what makes reversing the drug trade almost impossible. At the lowest level are the farmers who grow the crop. These farmers make little more than they would growing other crops, but are assured help. People come to pick up the crop, and the farmers know they will at least make a living. Many know that if they stop growing the crop, they will be killed. These people are normally innocent and well intentioned, and going after this tier in the system would be ineffective as well as too expansive and far-fetched. Next is a series of tiers including the people who pick up the drugs, people who sell the drugs at open bazaars, and people who are dealing the mostly raw poppies to manufactures and other dealers. Then there are people who manufacture the drugs into different opiates, turning the harmless plant into a lethal drug. These people are closely monitored by people higher up, people in the Taliban. The drugs are then sold, shipped, or transported in some way with every step being taxed by the Taliban. Billions of dollars are being made. Complicating the process is the involvement of bigger players, such as Al Queada and Osama Bin Laden. Reports claim that Osama Bin Laden’s personal connections have opened up major drug routes for the Taliban. In turn the Taliban protects and supplies Osama Bin Laden with resources. Another major player in the drug trade, is the arms trade. Arms dealers from Russia constitute the major buys of drugs from Afghanistan. Russian arms dealers meet with Taliban drug lords at a bazaar deep in Tajikistan’s desert near the border region with Afghanistan. The bazaar is said to exist solely for the trade of Afghan drugs for Russian guns. Drugs are almost never traded for cash here because guns have a much higher value in Afghanistan. It is said a kilo of pure heroine can be expected to bring in thirty AK-47s. The guns are then broken down into parts and smuggled back into Afghanistan, where they are shipped to the front lines. Smugglers claim that the Taliban gets far more than 60 percent of their munitions from this type of drug trade.3
With profits so great, it is disheartening but true that protection comes from higher places. A former Afghan smuggler is quoted “’We are like a company, we have some big sponsors who support us in the government.’” This is one of the biggest factors which limits the ability to take down the drug trade. NATO has had difficulties getting President Karzai’s backing in going after drug traffickers, and the military follows mandate that does not cover the drug trade.
1. Perl, Raphael F. "Page Not Found." Foreign Press Centers. 5 Oct. 2001. Web. 08 Apr. 2010.
2. Perl, Raphael F. "CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Taliban and the Drug Trade." 5 Oct. 2001. Web.
3. Starkey, Jerome. "Drugs for Guns: How the Afghan Heroin Trade Is Fuelling the Taliban Insurgency - Asia, World - The Independent." The Independent | News | UK and Worldwide News | Newspaper. 29 Apr. 2008. Web. 08 Apr. 2010.
Thursday, April 1, 2010
Intro to IR
3/31/10
The Taliban
The Taliban, a Pashto word meaning “students”, is a Sunni Islamist political movement that governed Afghanistan from 1996 until they were overthrown in late 2001 during the United Nations Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2004 the Taliban regrouped and revived as a strong insurgency movement governing at the local level and fighting a guerrilla war against the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The movement is made up of members belonging to different ethnic Pashtun tribes, along with a number of volunteers from nearby Islamic countries such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Arabs, Punjabis and others. They operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, mostly around the Durand Line regions. U.S. officials say their headquarters is in or around Quetta, Pakistan, and that Pakistan and Iran are supporting them, although both nations deny it.
The Taliban is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, who is still in hiding. Mullah Omar's original commanders were former small-unit military commanders and madrasah teachers, and the rank-and-file made up mostly of Afghan refugees who had studied at Islamic religious schools in Pakistan. The Taliban received valuable training, supplies and arms from the Pakistani government, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and many recruits from madrasahs for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, primarily ones established by the JUI.
Although in control of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, and much or most of the country for five years, the Taliban regime, which called itself the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It has gained some amount of political control and acceptance in Pakistan's border region, but recently lost one of its key leaders, Baitullah Mehsud, in a CIA missile strike However Pakistan has launched offensive to force out the Taliban. The Taliban implemented one of the strictest interpretations of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim world, yet still occasionally updates its code of conduct.
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Afghan and Pakistani officials have announced that once a formal request from Kabul is received in Islamabad, Pakistan will transfer the Afghan Taliban’s number two, Mullah Baradar back to Afghanistan. Reports suggest the head of the FBI requested U.S. custody of Baradar but was turned down. Upwards of 7 of the 15 head Taliban leaders have allegedly been arrested, varying from the 3 alleged arrests reported earlier in the week. Both figures suggest a much closer relationship between the Pakistani intelligence agencies and the CIA. Pakistani officials also announce that a blast killing three U.S. soldiers was in-fact targeted at a jeep thought to be carrying local paramilitary officials.
After a combined NATO and Afghan raid, the town of Marjah has been freed from Taliban rule. Afghani police raised the Afghan flag over the city before a crowd of over seven hundred. America has initiated large scale munitions sales to both India and Pakistan in the recent weeks, including F16 jets, and laser guided missiles. While Pakistan acquires these weapons through U.S. grants, India purchases them with their own funds. The article ends with a paragraph describing an Washington Post investigation into cash flows out of the country, finding strange patters such as a 2 month summer period where more than 180$ million was declared by afghan passengers heading to Dubai.
This article from Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel is an insightful overview of recent events. The ”hottest” topic in current events seems to be the apparent tightening of CIA and Pakistani intelligence. The handing over of Baradar to Afghanistan also shows trust and a willingness to work together on the part of the Pakistanis, a fairly new and progressive attitude. The raid of Marjah was hailed as a success, which could have influenced the recent decision to trade large quantities of advanced military technology to both Pakistan and India. This strongly suggests cohesiveness behind the scenes.
Daily brief: coordinated Taliban attacks leave 18 dead in Afghan capital
More than a month of calm was ended on the morning the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, when Taliban suicide bombers in cars and on foot targeted two buildings in Kabul, the Afghan capital. The building was often used by foreign visitors and as many as 18 people including an Italian, a Frenchman, ten Indians, and a Pakistani, were killed. Witnesses claimed the bombers also used guns and grenades, and the attacks left eight Afghans including three police officers dead and some 40 wounded. The attack could suggest that the Taliban as a whole has not been suffered greatly by the ongoing coalition offensive in Marjah. However, this could also suggest an act of desperation in order to bluff that they have not been wounded.
A Washington Post reporter writes that the recent crackdown may put pressure on the Taliban, but the Taliban has survived the loss of senior leaders before. This is followed by a report that Mullah Baradar will in-fact be kept in Pakistani custody and not handed over to Afghans. On wednesday a suspected U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan reportedly killed a commander in the 'Punjabi Taliban' who was wanted in connection with the 2006 bombing on the U.S. consulate in Karachi.
This article starts out as an overview of a recent bombing, and continues with information that supports an ongoing trend in articles about Afghanistan and Pakistan. Disorganization. With every article comes a new decision contradicting the previous article. After reading four articles, two will claim that a prisoner is being transferred from Pakistan to Afghanistan, while another will say he is not, and the other will claim he was not arrested at all. It is tough to know which articles to trust, as they are all coming from legitimate sources.
Pakistan flag flies over former Taliban stronghold
The Pakistani army claims it has flushed the militants out of the tribal region of Bajaur, where fighting has been going on since August 2008. The Taliban center of operations was in an area called Damadola, just in front of giant peaks. The Pakistani flag was raised for the first time in the history of the state. The Taliban had dug in, literally, carving about 150 caves and tunnels deep into the mountains. BBC was able to send reporters into the cave to take fascinating pictures, which captured the haste in which the fighters fled by revealing rugs, bedding, and even shoes left behind. The caves are estimated to have taken five or six years to build.
The Pakistani general in charge believes the insurgents are defeated, but they have been defeated only to return before. Local militia have risen to the scene and vow to fight the Taliban if they return. The army is counting on militia such as this to help keep the Taliban at bay. Losing the support of the public is a major step in eradicating the Taliban. Pakistani officials are voicing that they want to see a lot more action similar to this across the border in Afghanistan. They also claim that locals, above all, want jobs. Being employed will keep people occupied, and allow to the purchase needed commodities and improve their quality of life. Without employment it is much easier to be persuaded by the Taliban.
This article shows positive progression in the fight against Taliban. The effort of Pakistani Military in the border region is vital for the ongoing suppression of the Taliban. The article reaffirms reports of Pakistan stepping up its military presence and influence in the border region. Another very important aspect that is underscored is the reception of the military by local leaders and the public. The heros welcome that the soldiers received is a strong indication that Taliban influence is diminishing in the region, and unlikely to return.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
“Pakistan’s Push For New Role in Afghanistan”
This BBC article explores the apparent shift in Pakistan’s approach to the war in Afghanistan. The article opens by discussing the resent alleged arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who is second in command of the Taliban hierarchy, by the Pakistani police. The arrest is the catalyst of the new Pakistani approach, wanting more and more influence in negotiations between the Taliban and counter-insurgence forces.
However, there is opposition and frustration coming from NATO forces following this new shift. It does not specify as to why there is frustration, and what negative consequences could result. The article discusses how the Obama administration has been urging Pakistan to become more involved in the process, unlike the Bush administration. A Pakistani General bluntly announces that the Taliban is the future of Afghanistan, and Pakistan would be foolish not to be involved in negotiating with them. The article finishes up reporting that Washington is hailing Islamabad for their co-operation. This just weeks after the U.S. lost seven operatives to a double agent suicide bomb.
The article is one of many that are focusing on the apparently new shift in Pakistan’s policy. The article attempts objectiveness, both praising and voicing concerns for the new movement. It seems that all sides have both fears and praise for the new shift, creating an unsure atmosphere that will most likely play itself out in the near future. The arrests are positive for the public, but the article and other information suggests that the Pakistani government knows where these people are at all times, and therefore the sudden arrest suggests only shifted interests and not genuine progression with dismantling the Taliban.
“Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Kabir 'seized in Pakistan'”
This BBC article discusses various alleged arrests along with some confirmed arrests of high-ranking Taliban officials. The article opens by discussing the alleged arrest of Mullah Abdul Kabir, believed to be a member of the Taliban leadership council based in Pakistan. Local police and military spokesmen deny the arrest, as do spokesmen for the Taliban. This alleged arrest would come following a series of other arrests, including two “puppet- governors” of northern Afghan provinces.
Neither of these arrests have been confirmed, by the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has been confirmed. Reports claim that Baradar oversaw Taliban military operations in Afghanistan, run the group's leadership council and controlled its finances. Coalition forces continue their fight is southern Afghanistan. Other Taliban leaders such as Mullah Mohammed Younis have been arrested. All reports come from unnamed Pakistani intelligence officials, making the data very hard to verify.
The article is attempting to gather information about alleged arrests and compile them. The new shift in Pakistani policies is unclear to say the least. The arrests suggest that Pakistan is finally deciding to put pressure on on the Taliban in Pakistan, or that they want to bring in Taliban officials to negotiate, to try and end this chaotic period. It is vital for the U.S. to figure out what the Pakistani interests are so that we can get on the same page and work together.
“Pakistan Plays Ball”
This Foreign Policy, AfPak channel article discusses the possible shift in Pakistani interests as well. The U.S. has been waiting since 2001 for Pakistan to show a committed effort to the war. Despite Pakistan’s President’s continued pledge of support, U.S. intelligence suspects Pakistan of protecting Afghan Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and others. Up to nine arrests have been made of Taliban officials, most likely due to evidence provided by formerly captured Baradar.
These arrests, along with former arrests in the past five years, show the ever-increasing army-to-army cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan. Part of the new shift could possibly be the new appointment to the head of the ISI (Pakistan’s spying agency) Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha and new head of the army staff Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. These two have distanced themselves from their predecessors and given U.S. intelligence much needed data on Taliban activities, whereabouts, and personnel.
This article is more optimistic then other articles about the changing shift in Pakistan’s policies towards Afghan Taliban. The article implies that these arrests are a statement by Pakistan that they are firmly in the war against the Taliban, and on the same page as the U.S. However, there clearly information missing from this article explaining why Pakistan would make these arrests so abruptly. It is most likely that they want to be considered a major player in fighting the Taliban, as to have a major say in the aftermath- whatever that may be.